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I. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance primarily refers to the making of small loans to low-income
individuals and the poor, to enable them to start or expand small businesses.1
Currently, most microfinance loans are made through nonprofit microfinance
institutions (MFIs) that receive donor money.2 However, donor-funded loans
can account for only a small portion of the need. Microfinance analysts
estimate, for example, that total market potential is $300 billion,3 of which only
ten percent is currently being captured.4 Increasingly, the shortfall in funding is
*
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1.
Neil MacFarquhar, Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2010, at A1 (describing how Muhammad Yunus, who recently won the Nobel Prize in
2006 for conceiving of microfinance, and others have noticed how banks and financial
institutions now dominate the microfinance field, with some banks charging the poor very
high interest rates).
2.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: An Inquiry into Commercially
Sustainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3),
available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=working_papers.
3.
Harald Hüttenrauch & Claudia Schneider, Securitisation: A Funding Alternative
for Microfinance Institutions, in NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION IN MICROFINANCE 299,
322 (Ingrid Matthäus-Maier & J.D. von Pishke eds., 2008) (estimating that total demand for
microloans exceed $300 billion).
4.
Drew Tulchin, Positioning Microfinance Institutions for the Capital Markets 1
(Soc. Enters. Assocs., Working Paper No. 5, 2004). Standard & Poor’s has estimated that of
the one-and-a-half billion people potentially eligible for microfinance loans, only one
hundred million people—less than seven percent—receive them. STANDARD & POOR’S,
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being met by commercial banks.5 But commercial-bank intermediation is
expensive, with a global average effective interest rate (on commercial
microfinance loans) reported to be as high as thirty-seven percent.6
I have separately argued that microfinance lending can benefit through
securitization.7 Securitization envisions the creation of a special-purpose
vehicle (“SPV,” sometimes called a special-purpose entity or SPE) that
effectively replaces commercial banks as intermediaries of funds from capital
market sources (such replacement being called “disintermediation”). Unlike
commercial banks, the SPV is not intended to be profit-making.8 The SPV
issues securities to capital market investors9 and uses the proceeds to acquire
rights to payment, which are intangibles, under loans, leases, and other
financial assets. These intangible rights, in turn, constitute the source of
repayment of the SPV’s securities.10
Securitization can be applied to microfinance in two ways.11 The more
straightforward way, which to some extent is already occurring, is to securitize
an MFI’s donor-funded microfinance loans in order to regenerate funding for
MICROFINANCE: TAKING ROOT IN THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 9 (2007).
5.
MacFarquhar, supra note 1.
6.
Id. (reporting “a global average of about 37 percent in interest and fees”).
7.
Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 6).
8.
See, e.g., Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, New
Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95, 132 (2000) (observing that SPVs are
not intended to profit, so taxes should not be an issue).
9.
These investors are usually located in major money centers. But cf. Hüttenrauch
& Schneider, supra note 3, at 323 & n.49 (observing that ProCredit Bank AD, Bulgaria was
able to issue microfinance-loan-backed bonds in local markets); Susan Davis & Rod
Dubitsky, Microfinance Meets Wall Street, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2008, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/22/brac-microfinance-creditsuisse-opedcx_sdrd_0326brac.html (describing how BRAC, led by Citibank, issued microfinance-loanbacked securities locally in Bangladesh). Some SPVs are located in Luxembourg because of
its favorable securitization laws that allow a single SPV to carry out many different
transactions by multiple, legally separated groups within the same SPV. Christopher J.
Carolan & Madeleine M.L. Tan, Microfinance & Securitization: A Profitable Partnership
for Socioeconomic Development, INT’L SECURITIZATION & FIN. REP., Apr. 15, 2008, at 12.
10. For a more complete discussion of securitization, including the transactional
steps mentioned above, see generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d. ed.2007 & Supp. 2010) [hereinafter
STRUCTURED FINANCE]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.
L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994). Securitization is economically efficient when the interest-rate
cost saving achieved through this disintermediation more than offsets the transaction costs of
the securitization. Id. at 137-38 (observing that transaction costs, which include the cost of
creating the SPV and sometimes also the cost of obtaining a rating on its securities, can vary
over a wide range depending on the securitization structure).
11. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 8).
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the MFI to make additional loans (“regenerative securitization”).12 A more
innovative way would be to fund new microfinance lending through the capital
markets without expensive commercial-bank intermediation (“transformative
securitization”).13
II. THE PROBLEM
Either form of securitization, however, faces a problem under commercial
law. To successfully securitize microfinance loans, the MFI originating the
loans would have to transfer the loans to the SPV. That transfer will often have
to constitute a sale.14
The law governing that transfer will likely depend on the MFI’s location.15
For MFIs located in the United States, United States law would apply.16 But
for an MFI located in Country X, the law of Country X would likely be
applicable.17 In that case, investors would want to ensure that the transfer of
the microfinance loans is protected from creditors of the MFI under the law of
Country X. Country X could well be the country where the end-borrowers are
located if, for example, the MFI must be locally licensed there to make the
loans.
III. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY
That calls into question whether Country X law is sufficiently developed to
address the sale or other transfer of intangible rights like microfinance loans—
which are essentially rights to payment—and, if so, whether the SPV or the
MFI is required to take steps to protect or “perfect” the transfer. The rationale
for requiring protective steps is to prevent the transfer of intangible rights from

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of International Securitization, 12
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 285, 291 (2002).
15. UNITED NATIONS, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF RECEIVABLES IN
INT’L TRADE, at 15, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.14 (2004), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-assignment-conventione.pdf [hereinafter U.N. CONVENTION] (making the law of the transferor’s jurisdiction
applicable when determining priority of claimants’ rights to receivables); see U.C.C.
§§ 9-301(1), 9-305(c) (2008) (the location of the transferor determines the jurisdiction whose
law governs perfection); Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 292.
16. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 23).
17. Id.

498

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:2

being regarded as fraudulent vis-à-vis third parties, such as creditors of the
MFI, who cannot actually see the transfer.18
In the United States, a transfer of intangible rights is normally perfected by
filing, in a public registry, a description of the transferred assets.19 In many
other countries, however, perfection procedures for transferring intangible
rights, when they exist, are unclear or impractical—such as requiring the
obligors on the intangible rights (in our case, the borrowers on the microfinance
loans) to be notified of the transfer.20 Moreover, in countries where transfers
are perfected without public registration or some other form of objectively
ascertainable public notice, a transferee—in our case, the SPV—cannot know
that its interest in the intangible rights will have priority over third-party
interests.21 This can create a fraud risk, enabling a transferor to purport to
transfer the same rights to multiple parties.22 Perfection procedures that are
unclear or impractical or that enable fraud will discourage commercial transfers
of intangible rights,23 thereby discouraging securitization of microfinance
loans.
In Ghana and the Philippines, for example, the perfection requirement “has
emerged as a substantial constraint to rural credit access.”24 Determining if
there are prior superior claims on assets pledged as collateral can also be very
difficult in Latin America.25 In Uruguay, a transferee cannot search records by
the name of the transferor but must know the date of any prior transfer.26 In
Bolivia, a transferee of intangible rights must look through an entire registry to
determine if there have been prior transfers that have priority.27 Many other

18. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (examining whether transfers
of intangible rights can be fraudulent, creating “secret liens”).
19. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (requiring the filing of financing statements for perfection).
20. Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 292-93.
21. Id. at 293.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 294. For an analysis of public registration for transfers of intangible rights,
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection System for Cross-Border
Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (1999).
24. Joselito Gallardo, A Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions: The
Experience in Ghana and the Philippines 31 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 2755,
2002).
25. Glenn D. Westley, Can Financial Market Policies Reduce Income Inequality? 32
(Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Sustainable Dev. Dep’t Technical Papers Series No. MSM-112,
2001),
available
at
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/128760/Can%20
Financial%20Markets%20Reduce%20Income%20Inequality.pdf.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Latin American countries have even less developed transfer mechanisms.28
The problem has become so important that The World Bank is attempting to
address it.29
These problems could be exacerbated when microfinance loans are
transferred as part of a securitization. Microfinance loans are often made to
individuals in a neighborhood peer group, who jointly and severally become
obligated for repayment.30 Also, because microfinance loans are typically
made in small amounts, a commercially viable securitization may have to
include thousands of microfinance loans to offset transaction costs. If the
relevant MFI’s jurisdiction requires notification of obligors for perfection, that
would require many thousands of notices.
This essay next examines how the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in
the United States facilitates the transfer of intangible rights—an approach that,
with principled modifications, other nations might consider examining in order
to help facilitate the securitization of microfinance loans.
IV. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In the United States and, in the author’s experience, also in many other
countries, transfers of intangible rights are generally regarded as either sales or
transfers for security.31 Article 9 of the UCC governs transfers for security of
28. See id.; cf. SWATI R. GHOSH, EAST ASIAN FINANCE 19 (2006) (finding that
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia have adequate legal frameworks for securitization).
29. See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Where to File Against Non-U.S. Debtors: Applying
UCC § 9-307(c)[Rev] to Foreign Filing, Recording, and Registration Systems, 39 UCC L.J.
109, 262 (2006) (noting that The World Bank considers a filing system important to
securitization and “continue[s] to pressure debtor countries to establish filing systems and a
supporting legal framework”); Gallardo, supra note 24, at 4 (observing that The World Bank
has been helping countries to adopt comprehensive legal frameworks for transferring
intangible rights, including modernizing registry systems); GLOBAL FIN. MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L
FIN.
CORP.,
SECURITISATION
IN
RUSSIA
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/home.nsf/Content/Securitization_in_Russia (reporting the findings
and advice of a World Bank Group delegation that advised Russia in drafting new
securitization laws).
30. Beatriz Armendáriz de Aghion & Jonathan Morduch, Microfinance Beyond
Group Lending, 8 ECON. OF TRANSITION 401, 402 (2000) (describing group lending as a
practice by MFIs that is “typically comprised of three to seven neighbours”); Begoña
Gutiérrez-Nietoa, Carlos Serrano-Cinca & Cecilio Mar Molinerob, Microfinance Institutions
and Efficiency, 35 OMEGA 131, 132 (2007); cf. Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke
Renner, Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance Institutions, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 614,
615-16 (2006) (stating how MFIs, when adopting jointly-obligated schemes, must balance
insuring individual risks against an individual’s reliance on other borrowers to repay the
loans that gives the individual an incentive to free-ride).
31. There can be, of course, other types of transfers, such as transfers in trust or into
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most assets, including intangible rights. Article 9’s basic function is to perfect
and give priority, in a simple and low-cost manner, to these transfers. It
normally accomplishes this, as mentioned, by having a party to the transfer file
a description of the transferred assets with a public registry.32 Once so filed,
the transferee secured by the assets (the “secured party”) can determine its
priority by examining if there are any other filings describing those assets.33
Transferees who file first obtain first priority (often referred to as first-in-time,
first-in-right).34
More significant to this essay, the UCC expands Article 9’s perfection-andpriority filing system to also cover transfers of intangible rights35 that constitute
sales, not merely transfers for security.36 This expansion was intended to bring
these sales within the UCC’s simple and low-cost perfection and priority rules
that govern secured transactions.37 The rationale for doing this was to facilitate
modern commercial finance, including securitization, in which sales of
intangible rights are critical.38 Thus, under Article 9, sales of these intangible
rights were intended to be perfected and to obtain priority in the same manner
as if those sales were transfers as security—simply by filing a financing
statement in a public recording system (“notice filing”). This is the principle
that—as applied to sales of intangible rights—should inform microfinance, as
discussed below.

escrow.
32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
33. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2008).
34. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2008).
35. More precisely, intangible rights for the payment of money.
36. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2008).
37. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE U.C.C., COMMENTARY NO. 14 (SECTION
9-102(1)(b)) FINAL DRAFT (June 10, 1994) (explaining that the “reason for subjecting both
sales and secured transactions to [UCC] Article 9 was to inform third parties of existing
interests in a debtor’s receivables and to provide protection for all types of assignments of
receivables”; and adding a paragraph to Official Comment 2 to section 9-102 to explain that
“Article 9 applies . . . to sales of [intangible rights] primarily to incorporate Article’s 9’s
perfection rules”).
38. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 455 (observing that intangible rights may
constitute one of the largest categories of assets transferred in cross-border financing). An
Official Comment to UCC section 9-109 states that the scope rule of subsection (a)(3)
thereof is intended to “avoid[] difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in
which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold
outright. . . . [Because] [i]n many commercial financing transactions the distinction is
blurred.” U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4 (2008). This rationale is not completely convincing,
however, because anyone having any question as to whether a given transaction is a secured
transfer or a sale could always perfect as if it were a secured transaction.
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There is, however, a technical caveat. Due to what I believe were
misguided lobbying efforts,39 the 2001 revisions to UCC Article 9 undermined
the notice-filing principle by providing, in new sections 9-309(3) & (4), that
sales of “payment intangibles” and of promissory notes are “perfected when
they attach,” meaning they are perfected automatically without the need to file
financing statements in a public registry.40
Payment intangibles and
promissory notes are terms that, if applied to microfinance, would include most
if not all microfinance loans.41
Automatic perfection, like notice filing, makes it feasible to sell intangible
rights.42 However, automatic perfection, unlike notice filing, prevents
transferees, such as an SPV, from knowing whether its interest in the purchased
intangible rights will have priority over third-party interests, creating a fraud
risk.43 My article advocates that microfinance should be informed by applying
the notice-filing principle of the UCC—not the distortion of that principle
created by automatic perfection—to sales of intangible rights.
V. APPLICATION TO MICROFINANCE
To control lending costs, local MFIs with knowledge about the
microfinance borrowing community typically must originate microfinance
loans.44 They therefore would be selling these loans to SPVs.45 The law of the
nation where a microfinance borrowing community, and thus the loanoriginating MFI, is located would thus govern perfection of the sale of those
loans.46
Nations that wish to expand the availability of low-cost microfinance
lending to their local communities are therefore the very nations that should
consider perfecting sales of intangible rights through notice filing. A nation
could do this merely by enacting a law that enables sales of microfinance loans
39. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947 (1999) (contributing to that Law Review’s Symposium
on Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, I explain why those lobbying efforts were
misguided).
40. See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (2008).
41. Where microfinance loans are not evidenced by promissory notes, the intangible
rights to payment under the loan agreements would constitute payment intangibles. See
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2008).
42. Compare supra text accompanying notes 19-20 (discussing unclear or
impractical perfection procedures for transferring intangible rights).
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
44. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26-28).
45. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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to be perfected—that is, protected from creditors of the transferor—by a simple
and low-cost filing in a public recording system.
There are other possible approaches. For example, drafters of the United
Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade
(the “UN Convention”) were unable to reach consensus on substantive rules for
establishing perfection and priority of cross-border transfers of intangible
rights, addressing these issues instead through conflict-of-laws rules.47 The UN
Convention makes the law of the assignor’s location govern perfection and
priority disputes,48 but it also offers a choice among three substantive law
priority systems: filing in a public recording system (in the Convention called a
“notice-filing system”), a notification-of-the-debtor system, and a system based
on the time of conclusion of the contract of assignment.49 A public recording
system, however, would avoid the notification-of-the-debtor problems that are
exacerbated by microfinance securitization50 and would also avoid the potential
for fraud that is created by a system, such as time-of-conclusion-of-thecontract-of-assignment, that does not require objectively ascertainable public
notice.51

47. U.N. CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 40-41.
48. See Spiros V. Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Financing:
UNCITRAL’s Impact on Securitization and Cross-Border Perfection, 12 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 365, 380 (2002). Location is defined by the assignor’s place of business, and if the
assignor does business in more than one country then the location is the assignor’s place of
central administration (principal place of business). U.N. CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 32.
49. Bazinas, supra note 48, at 383.
50. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

